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FOREWORD:
FROM MIRANDA TO § 3501
TO DICKERSON TO...
Yale Kamisar**
Once the Court granted [certiorariin Dickerson] court-watchers knew the
hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate
Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases [the cases viewing
Miranda's requirements as not rights protected by the Constitution, but
merely "prophylacticrules"] or offer some ingenious reconciliationof the
two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
doesn't "have to" do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again
reminds us.
Donald Dripps'

I.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULT ON MIRANDA

On June 19, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson reluctantly signed
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter
"the Crime Act" or "the Crime Bill"), a bill containing a provision
known as § 3501 because of its designation under Title 18 of the
United States Code.' Section 3501 appeared to make the pre-Miranda

* These remarks are based on my Introduction to the Symposium, "Miranda after
Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law," held at the University of Michigan Law School
on November 17-18, 2000.
** Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law
School; Visiting Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
1. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Miranda,
Dickerson, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming Fall 2001) (on file with author).
2. See Statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson upon signing the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 1 PUB PAPERS 725 (June 19, 1968) [hereinafter
Statement by the President]; Max Frankel, PresidentSigns Broad Crime Bill with Objections,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20,1968, at 1. The relevant portions of § 3501 read as follows:
§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if
it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall,
out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge
determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and
shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under
all the circumstances.
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v. Arizona3 "due process"-"totality of the circumstances""voluntariness" rule the sole test for the admissibility of confessions in
federal prosecutions, thereby purporting to "overrule" by legislation
the Supreme Court's most famous criminal procedure case.
In upholding § 3501, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit deemed it "important to note" that Congress did not completely abandon the central holding of Miranda,
i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed, § 3501
specifically lists the Miranda warnings as factors that a district court

(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all
the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required
to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether
or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession....
(e) As used in this section, the term 'confession' means any confession of guilt of any
criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.
President Johnson did not sign the Crime Bill until almost the last hour, finally
concluding that it contained "more good than harm." Frankel, supra; see also RICHARD
HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 109-10 (1969). In signing the bill, the President pointed out
that he had asked both the Attorney General and FBI Director to assure him that federal
attorneys and agents would continue to give suspects "full and fair warning" of their
constitutional rights. See Statement by the President, supra; Frankel, supra.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda v. Arizona held for the first time that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies to the informal proceedings in the interrogation room (or
other custodial situations) as well as to more formal proceedings such as those in a
courtroom or before a congressional committee. Now that the privilege did apply to
custodial police interrogation, the Court told us, in effect, that it was no longer acceptable
for the police to question suspects as they had in the past - acting as if they had a right to an
answer and leading suspects to believe that it would be so much the worse for them if they
did not answer. Hence the need for either the Miranda warnings or other procedural
safeguards that are "at least as effective." 384 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 476, 490.
Although the Miranda warnings are the best-known feature of the case, they are not the
most important. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer has emphasized, Miranda contains a series
of holdings: (1) informal pressure to speak "can constitute 'compulsion' within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment"; (2) this element of informal compulsion is present in custodial
interrogation; and (3) the now-familiar warnings (or some equally effective alternative) "are
required to dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation." Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436 (1987). I share Professor Schulhofer's
view (as expressed in this Symposium) that "the core of Miranda is located in the first two
steps." Id.; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson and the Puzzling Persistence
of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 951 (2001) [hereinafter
Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence].
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should consider when determining whether a confession was voluntarily
given. 4
The trouble with this analysis is that § 3501 does not require the
police to issue any warnings to custodial suspects; the section only
directs the trialjudge to consider certain factors when determining the
voluntariness of a confession. Moreover, although some of the factors
listed in § 3501 may resemble the Miranda warnings to someone
unfamiliar with the pre-Miranda confession cases, on a closer look
they turn out to include only some of the many components of the preMiranda test.
Section 3501(b) does set forth various factors that the trial judge
"shall take into consideration," including whether or not the suspect
has been advised of his rights, but goes on to say that "the presence or
absence of any of [these] factors ... need not be conclusive on the

issue of the voluntariness of the confession."5 The operative words are
"take into consideration" and "factors."
By the early 1960s, the voluntariness test, which had become
"increasingly meticulous through the years,"'6 also took into
consideration such factors as whether the suspect had been advised of
his rights.7 Thus, § 3501 added nothing to the pre-Miranda test for
8
admitting confessions into evidence.
How did § 3501 come about? Fred Graham, the Supreme Court
correspondent for the New York Times at the time § 3501 was debated
and enacted into law, furnishes some background: When the Crime
Bill containing what was to become § 3501 reached the Senate floor,
Graham reports, "it was immediately seen as a bald Congressional
attempt to rap the Supreme Court's knuckles over crime;" the bill's
provisions reflected "the sentiments of a committee that was
dominated by Southern senators who had been nursing hurt feelings
over the school desegregation decision of 1954 and who wanted to
take it out on the Supreme Court over crime." 9 Another close student
of the crime bill noted that during the Senate subcommittee hearings
chaired by Senator John McClellan "the familiar claims of a direct
connection between the enlargement of procedural requirements and
a rising crime rate were paraded by a parade of district attorneys,
4. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000).
5. See supra note 2 (reprinting the text of § 3501).
6. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730-71 (1966) (discussing the pre-Miranda
voluntariness test).
7. See id.; Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure(1965),
in BENCHMARKS 235,249 (1967).
8. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 930-36 (2000).
9. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICrED WOUND 319-20 (1970).
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police chiefs and other representatives of what might be called the 'law
enforcement lobby.' ""
Where were the opponents of the proposal that became § 3501?
When Senator Joseph Tydings, who led the opposition to the Crime
Bill in the Senate, charged that not a single constitutional law or
criminal procedure professor had been given an opportunity to testify
before Senator McClellan's subcommittee on the desirability or
constitutionality of the bill's anti-Miranda provision," McClellan did
not deny it. 2 As I have pointed out elsewhere:
The conspicuous absence of any law professors at the subcommittee
hearings (or any defense lawyers or public defenders for that matter)
could hardly be attributed to a lack of interest by those in academia.
When asked by Senator Tydings to state their views on the desirability of
§ 3501 and other anti-Court provisions and on the power of Congress to
enact them, 212 law professors (including twenty-four law school deans)
from forty three law schools had responded. Most attacked the
constitutionality
of the anti-Mirandaprovision; not a single one defended
3
it.

10. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 141
(1973).
11. See 114 CONG. REC. 11,901 (1968).
12. See id. Senator McClellan responded simply that every member of the Senate had
been invited to testify and that somebody from Tydings's own state (the president of the
Maryland district attorneys association) had also testified.
13. Kamisar, supra note 8, at 902. The full text of the law professors and law school
deans' letters to Senator Tydings appears in CONG. REC. 13, 851-67 (1968).
After noting that I "point to a 'conspicuous absence of any law professors at
subcommittee hearings' as one reason for not crediting the Senate Judiciary Committee's
report," Professor Cassell comments, with his usual wit, that while "many of us in the
academy will find merit in Kamisar's suggestion that academics are vital to congressional
deliberations, this is no requirement for crediting legislative findings." Paul G. Cassell, The
Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failure in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 926
n.152 (2001). I am not suggesting that the presence of law professors at subcommittee
hearings is "vital" in every case nor that the absence of any law professors at such hearings is
"conspicuous" on every occasion. What I am saying is that the complete absence of law
professors is conspicuous when (a) a bill raises a serious question about the constitutional
power of Congress to legislate, in this instance in an area in which the Supreme Court has
just issued a ruling, (b) many government officials have been invited to give their views on
the need for and the constitutionality of the proposed legislation and all have testified in
favor of the bill, and (c) more than 200 law professors have demonstrated their interest in the
subject by expressing their views in writing to a member of the Senate.
I fail to see why much weight should be given to the testimony presented when the only
people permitted to testify at the subcommittee hearings are those expected to advance the
cause of the subcommittee's chairman. Moreover, as I have discussed elsewhere, see
Kamisar, supra note 8, at 902-06, on those rare occasions when a witness who testified before
McClellan's subcommittee said something that disappointed the chairman, the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report either misrepresented that testimony or completely ignored it.
Professor Cassell would draw a distinction between Congress's legal determinations
about the constitutionality of § 3501 and its factual determination about the underlying harm
to law enforcement (a subject on which, Professor Cassell seems to suggest, the law
professors had nothing important or useful to say). See Cassell, supra at 926 n.152. I do not
believe this distinction holds up. In the first place, as an astute commentator has pointed out,
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II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MIRANDA

Although there was reason to think the Court might uphold the
constitutionality of § 3501 when the Court finally addressed the issue
in the year 2000 (because of the post-Warren Court's characterizations
of and comments about Miranda in the three decades since the case
was decided), it is difficult to see how § 3501 could have passed
constitutional muster had the Court decided its fate in 1968 or 1969.
Indeed, I venture to say that at the time the Miranda opinion was
handed down almost everyone who read it (including the dissenting
Justices) understood that it was a constitutional decision - an
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.
As Justice White, who wrote a forceful dissent in Miranda,told the
conference of state chief justices a year later:
Is the arrested suspect, alone with police in the stationhouse, being
"compelled" to incriminate himself when he is interrogated without
proper warnings? Reasonable men may differ about the answer to that
question, but the question itself is a perfectly straightforward one under
the Fifth Amendment and little different in kind from many others which
arise under the Constitution and which must be decided by the courts.

[W]hatever its merits, [Miranda] is plainly a derivative of Malloy v.
Hogan, applying the Fifth Amendment to the States, and Gideon v.

Wainwright, which required counsel in most kinds of criminal cases. In
terms of the function which the Court was performing, I see little
difference between Miranda and the several other decisions, some old,
some new, which have construed the Fifth Amendment in a manner in

"as a general matter, it can be said that the entire congressional debate [over the part of the
Crime Bill containing § 3501] was notably devoid of anything but the most speculative
assertion of facts" - a point any number of law professors could have developed. Robert A.
Burt, Miranda and Title I: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 126. Moreover,
to the extent that Congress's factual determinations were based on the claims and prophecies
of law enforcement officials that Miranda was wreaking havoc, and would continue to do so,
any number of law professors could have pointed out, for example, that this was most likely
a temporary condition produced (and mistakenly so) by giving the Miranda doctrine limited
retroactive effect.
As Fred Graham observed some time after § 3501 was enacted into law, by applying
Miranda to all cases tried after the date of the decision, even though the police questioning
had taken place and the confessions had been obtained before Miranda was decided, see
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court "gave the impression that Miranda
had affected police interrogation far more than it actually had." GRAHAM, supra note 8, at
184. Although, in the weeks immediately following Miranda, cases of self-confessed killers
walking free were widely publicized, "[w]hat was ... rarely made clear to the public was that
[the] confessions [being tossed] out were only a relatively tiny, special group that were
reached retroactively by the Miranda decision." Id. at 184-85.

HeinOnline -- 99 Mich. L. Rev. 883 2000-2001

MichiganLaw Review

[Vol. 99:879

which it has never been construed before, or as in the case of Miranda,
contrary to previous decisions of the Court and of other courts as well. 4

Justice White's remarks to the state chief justices may surprise
some who remember how angry he seemed in his Miranda dissent. He
was not too angry, however, to point out that the fact that "the Court's
holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by the
language of the Fifth Amendment... does not prove either that the
Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise in
its present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment."' 5
One need not dwell on Justice White's views about what might be
called the legitimacy or the constitutional dimensions of Miranda.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Miranda speaks for
itself. And it speaks very quickly about the Fifth Amendment - it
states on the very first page that, in the cases before the Court, "we
deal with.., the necessity for procedures which assure that the
individual is accorded the privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself."' 6 Then it
tells us on the third page that the Court granted certiorari "in order
further to explore some facets of the problems of applying the
privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation and to
give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies
17
and courts to follow.
Forty-eight pages later, when bringing its opinion to a close, the
Court observed that although "Congress and the States are free to
develop their own safeguards, so long as they are fully as effective as
[the Miranda warnings], the issues presented are of constitutional
dimensions and must be determined by the courts.""s The Court
continued:

14. Justice Byron R. White, Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Address before the
Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES 42-43 (1967). The full citations to the cases cited by
Justice White are Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963). For substantial extracts from Justice White's 1967 address, see Kamisar, supra
note 8, at 908-09.
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
Added White:
[Wihat [the Court] has done is to make new law and new public policy in much

the same way that it has in the course of interpreting other great clauses of the
Constitution. This is what the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what it
must do and will continue to do until and unless there is some fundamental
change in the constitutional distribution of governmental powers.
Id.
16. Id. at 439.
17. Id. at 441-42.
18. Id. at 490.
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As courts have been presented with the need to enforce constitutional
rights, they have found means of doing so. That was our responsibility
when Escobedo was before us and it is our responsibility today. Where
rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them.19

As is well known, the Miranda Court discussed constitutional
principles generally for some fifty pages before concentrating on the
facts of the four cases before it. When it finally addressed the specific
facts of these cases, it began:
We turn now to these facts to consider the application to these cases of
the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have
concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant under
circumstances that did not meet constitutionalstandards for protection of
the privilege. 0

If there were any doubts about the constitutional status of
Miranda, they were dispelled three years later in Orozco v. Texas,1
when a majority of the Court voted to throw out a confession because
"obtain[ing] it in the absence of the required warnings was a flat
violation of the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
22'
construed in Miranda.
In the 1970s, however, a new majority of the Supreme Court, led
by a newly appointed Justice William Rehnquist, began kicking dirt at
Miranda. In Michigan v. Tucker,23 in the course of holding admissible
the testimony of a witness whose identity had been discovered by
questioning the defendant in violation of Miranda,Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for five members of the Court, maintained that the Miranda
Court itself had recognized that the now-familiar warnings "were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was protected. ' 24 Moreover, added Justice Rehnquist, the Miranda
19. Id. at 490-91 (referring to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).
20. 384 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added). The Miranda Court also compared and contrasted
the decision it was handing down with the McNabb-Mallory rule, noting that because of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the effectuation of these rules in McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and reaffirmed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957),
"we have had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the constitutionalissues in
dealing with federal interrogations." 384 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added). The Court added,
however, that "[t]hese supervisory rules ....were nonetheless responsive to the same
considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that unavoidably face us now as to the States." Id.
(emphasis added).
21. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
22. Id. at 326.
23. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
24. Id. at 444. What the Miranda Court said, if one reads the language in context, was
that the Miranda warnings were not necessarily required by the Constitution to neutralize
"the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted," but that
some procedural safeguards were required to do so, and "unless we are shown other
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Court pointed out that the suggested safeguards - what the Tucker
opinion called "the procedural rules" or the "prophylactic
standards.., laid down by the Court in Miranda"25 - "were not
intended to 'create a constitutional straightjacket,' but rather to
provide practical
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self26
incrimination.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Tucker, protested that Justice
Rehnquist had taken language from Miranda out of context. 27 Miranda
does tell us that the now-familiar warnings need not be given,
observed Douglas, but if - and only if- equally effective alternative
safeguards are in place'28- and "[t]here is no contention here that other
means were adopted.
Justice Douglas, then in his thirty-fifth year on the Court,
reminded his younger colleague:
The Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation
absent a constitutional basis. We held the "requirement of warnings and
waiver of rights [to be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege," and without so holding
we would have been
29
powerless to reverse Miranda's conviction.
procedures [safeguards other than the Miranda warnings] which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be observed." 384 U.S.
at 467.
25. 417 U.S. at 444-46.
26. Id. at 444. What the Miranda Court said, if one reads the language in context, was
that the Constitution does not require "any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process," 384 U.S. at 467, but it does require some solution, because
"when an individual is taken into custody [and] subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized," id. at 478. In this setting, therefore, the
Constitution does require some procedure safeguards to be employed - the warnings or
something equally effective. See id. at 478-79.
Ironically, the language from the Miranda opinion that Tucker and subsequent cases
building on Tucker used to disparage and to deconstitutionalize Miranda was inserted at the
suggestion of Justice Brennan, who thought that Congress and the States should be allowed
"latitude to devise other means (if they can) which might also create an interrogation climate
which has the similar effect [of the Miranda warnings] of preventing the fettering of a
person's own will." Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Chief Justice Earl Warren 3
(May 11, 1966) (on file with author). Justice Brennan made clear his belief that in the
absence of equally effective alternative safeguards the Miranda warnings were required. See
id. at 9. For a discussion of, and substantial extracts from, Justice Brennan's letter to the
Chief Justice, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 123-25
(1998). I am indebted to Professor Weisselberg for first calling the Brennan letter to my
attention.
27. See 417 U.S. at 462-63; see also supra notes 23, 25.
28. 417 U.S. at 463.
29. Id. at 462-63. A decade later, Justice Stevens made a similar point in his dissent in
Oregon v. Elstad - a case in which the Court declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine to a second confession obtained from a defendant whose Miranda rights had
not been honored the first time. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). Protesting the majority's "ambivalence"
about whether the use of a statement obtained by questioning an unwarned custodial suspect
is a "constitutional violation," Justice Stevens observed:
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Despite Justice Douglas's forceful dissent, the mischievous
language in Tucker did not go away. Indeed, it became quite
significant. In such cases as New York v. Quarles"° (recognizing a
"public safety" exception to the Miranda warnings) and Oregon v.
Elstad3t (declining to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
to a second statement elicited from a suspect whose first statement had
been obtained in- violation of Miranda), the Court built on the
language in the Tucker opinion and reiterated Tucker's way of looking
at, and thinking about, Miranda.
As Stephen Schulhofer points out in this Symposium, Tucker and
its progeny spoke as if, in the police interrogation setting (but not
other settings), "real compulsion" within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause "required precisely what the
Miranda Court had held unnecessary, the stringent 'breaking the will'
type of coercion that would be sufficient to render a confession
involuntary in traditional Fourteenth Amendment terms."32 As a
result of Tucker and its progeny, a successful defense of § 3501 (the
statute that purported to make the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test
the sole basis for the admissibility of a confession in a federal
at the time the statute
prosecution) - a defense that seemed hopeless
33
was enacted - now seemed a real possibility.

This Court's power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminating statements
rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution.
The same constitutional analysis applies whether the custodial interrogation is actually
coercive or irrebuttably presumed to be coercive. If the Court does not accept that premise,
it must regard the holding in the Miranda case itself, as well as all of the federal
jurisprudence that has evolved from that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate
exercise of raw judicial power.
Id. at 370-71.
30. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
31. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
32. Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 3, at 949-50. Professor Schulhofer
continues:
We will probably never know whether Justice Rehnquist realized, as he wrote Tucker, that
he was draining Fifth Amendment compulsion of its distinctive content, or whether verbal
similarities between compulsion and coercion by "breaking the will" simply obscured for him
the traditional distinction between Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements. Either
way, Tucker and subsequent cases echoing its language accomplished a world-class
conceptual counter-revolution.
Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards into the stationhouse under the expressly
stated assumption that those standards provided more protection than the traditional
Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness requirement. Fifth Amendment requirements do
"sweep more broadly" than those of the Fourteenth, and it was precisely for that reason that
incorporation was, in its day, so controversial. Starting with Tucker, the Court took the teeth
out of incorporation by asserting that compulsion meant nothing more than involuntariness
after all.
Id. at 950.
33. In the opening footnote to his article in this Symposium, Professor Cassell suggests,
ever so gently, that I may have been trying to mislead him when I said that I " 'wasn't sure'
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What happened in Dickerson?34 Early in his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that since "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution,"35 the case "turns on whether the Miranda Court
announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory
authority.., in the absence of congressional direction."36 Then, to the
surprise of many, the Chief Justice quickly dismissed the way some
majorities of the Court - and Rehnquist himself - had talked about
Miranda in the past.37 The arguments for viewing Miranda as a
constitutional decision, he now concluded, were quite strong - almost
overwhelming. "[F]irst and foremost," the Chief Justice told us, "is
that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to
proceedings in state courts."38 Moreover, since then we have
"consistently applied" the rule to the states and it is plain that "we do
not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States."39
For another thing, the Chief Justice reminded us, "the Miranda
opinion itself" begins and ends by telling us that the Court is
establishing constitutional standards.4" In addition, "the majority
opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought
it was announcing a constitutional rule."'"
What about the language in Miranda informing us that the decision
"in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have that effect '42 language that then-Justice Rehnquist had used to downgrade and
deconstitutionalize Miranda?43 The Chief Justice now tells us, in a
what the Supreme Court would do" if it were to address the constitutionality of § 3501.
Cassell, supra note 13, at 898. After the Tucker-line of cases, however, I wasn't sure.
When I spoke at Cornell Law School about the forthcoming Dickerson case three
months before the case was decided, I said it was "too close to call." CORNELL LAW FORUM

July 2000, at 15. I thought a 5-4 decision striking down § 3501 was the most that I could hope
for. On the basis of her opinion for the Court in Oregon v. Elstad, and her powerful dissent
in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), I doubted that Justice O'Connor would vote to
invalidate § 3501. And I certainly never considered the possibility that Chief Justice
Rehnquist would!
34. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2326 (2000).
35. Id. at 2332.
36. Id. at 2333.
37. "We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion [that the Miranda protections

are not constitutionally required], although we concede that there is some language in some
of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2333-34.
41. Id. at 2334. The dissenting Justices, it might be added, thought so too. See supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
42. 384 U.S. at 467.
43. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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footnote, that "a review of our opinion in Miranda" reveals that this
language only means that the Constitution does not require the specific
safeguards set forth in Miranda or any other particular procedure, not
that it does not require some safeguard beyond the totality-ofcircumstances test "that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment
rights.""
It is not an exaggeration to say that the Chief Justice's opinion in
Dickerson, written a quarter-century after he wrote the opinion of the
Court in Tucker, reads almost as if he recently reread Justice
Douglas's dissent in Tucker and, on further reflection, decided that
Douglas was right after all. Indeed, the Chief Justice's comments in
Dickerson read almost as if he recently reread the Miranda opinion
itself and discovered facts about Miranda and its companion cases and
language in the Mirandaopinion that he had not noticed before.
III. WHY DID CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST COME TO THE RESCUE OF
MIRANDA?

Why did the Chief Justice perform what appears to be a
remarkable turnaround? I have asked many law professors about this
and received a number of answers.
An explanation commonly offered is that when he realized that six
members of the Court were prepared to reaffirm Miranda, the Chief
Justice decided to vote with the majority so that he could assign the
opinion to himself rather then let it go to someone like Justice John
Paul Stevens, probably the strongest champion of Miranda on the
Court. (A number of those who subscribe to this view doubt very
much that the Chief Justice would have voted in favor of Miranda if
the vote had been 4-4, rather than 6-2.)
All this, of course, is speculation. For all we know, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor and Justice Anthony Kennedy, probably the two least
enthusiastic supporters of Miranda in the Dickerson majority, were
unable to make up their minds and Rehnquist persuaded them to vote
to strike down § 3501. Why would the Chief Justice have done that?
He may have decided that the best resolution of Dickerson would be a
compromise,45 one that "reaffirmed" Miranda's constitutional status
(thereby invalidating the federal statute that purported to overrule it),
but preserved all the qualifications and exceptions the much-criticized
case had acquired over three decades.46

44. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.6 (emphasis added).
45. See Dripps, supra note 1, at 3, 36 (on file with author),
46. 1 think it plain that the Chief Justice was talking about how various cases had
reduced the adverse impact of Miranda on law enforcement when he noted that "our
subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the rule on legitimate law enforcement," 120 S.
Ct. at 2336. For a helpful discussion of the different ways in which Miranda has been riddled
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Why wouldn't the Chief Justice, a strong and persistent critic of
Miranda, leap at the chance to eradicate the centerpiece of the socalled Warren Court revolution in American criminal procedure? Why
would he be interested in a compromise? Perhaps he was interested in
assuming an increasingly large leadership role as Chief Justice, as
opposed to his more partisan days as Associate Justice,47 and perhaps
he arrived at the conclusion that it was too late in the day to overturn
Miranda. Perhaps he realized that, in the year 2000, getting rid of the
nation's most famous criminal procedure case would have caused
more harm than good.
For one thing, more than three decades of Miranda jurisprudence
would have been wiped out. (As dissenting Justice Antonin Scalia
pointed out in Dickerson, in the thirty-four years since Miranda has
been handed down, "this Court has been called upon to decide nearly
60 cases involving a host of Miranda issues."48) Why erase all this case
law when Miranda had been so weakened by various limitations and
qualifications49 and the police had "adapted" to its requirements so
with qualifications and exceptions, see Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead? Was It Overruled?
Or Is It Irrelevant?,10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998).
47. Professor Craig Bradley, a former Rehnquist clerk and a close student of
Rehnquist's work, did not find the Chief Justice's vote in Dickerson unexpected. He points
out, inter alia, that in Dickerson Rehnquist "show[ed] the kind of leadership [of the Court]
that he has long admired in previous chief justices." Craig Bradley, Behind the Dickerson
Decision, TRIAL, Oct. 2000, at 80. Rehnquist, adds Bradley, especially had Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes in mind because he was "willing to modify his own opinions to hold
or increase his majority." Id.
A number of law professors with whom I have spoken believe that if he had still been an
Associate Justice at the time Dickerson was decided, Rehnquist would have dissented even though he was aware that six other members of the Court were voting to reaffirm
Miranda.
48. 120 S.Ct. at 2347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. Not all of the blame for Miranda'sinadequacies should be placed on the Burger or
Rehnquist Courts. Several Symposium participants have noted that once a suspect waives his
rights, Miranda has virtually nothing to say about - and thus imposes few, if any meaningful
restraints on - post-waiver police interrogation methods. See Richard A. Leo, Questioning
the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1015 (2001);
William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 989-90 (2001); Welsh S. White,
Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211,
1213, 1217, 1246 (2001). Professor White goes so far as to say that "its failure to identify and
to prohibit (or even to promote the identification and prohibition of) pernicious
interrogation practices" is "Miranda'smost significant limitation." Id. at 1220-21. But who is
to blame for this significant limitation?
Professor White suggests that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are. See id. at 1217,
1219-20. I would attribute most of the blame to the Miranda Court itself. To be sure, the
post-Warren Court could have interpreted Miranda to prohibit various post-waiver
interrogation techniques along the lines suggested by Professor White, see Welsh S. White,
Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581-90, 599-600, 628-29 (1979)
(noting that certain interrogation tactics that distort or undermine or vitiate the effect of the
Miranda warnings should be absolutely prohibited), but the Miranda Court could have, and
should have, done so itself. Miranda seems to contemplate only two situations: (a) the
suspect who asserts his rights, causing the police to leave; (b) the suspect who waives his
rights and then confesses to the crime. What about scenario (c): the suspect who waives his
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well5" that law enforcement officials could now, live with it quite
comfortably? As Richard Leo, a close student of modern police
interrogation techniques, sums up the current situation in this
Symposium: "Once feared to be the equivalent of sand in the
machinery of criminal justice, Miranda has now become a standard
part of the machine.""1
For another thing, there was reason to believe that overturning
Miranda would have caused a good deal of confusion. It would have
been no small feat to figure out what combination of circumstances
satisfied the ever-changing voluntariness test in the twenty-first
century. Nor would it have been easy to know exactly how the police
should respond when persons not warned of their "rights" asserted
what they thought were their rights on their own initiative or asked the
police what rights, if any, they had. 2

rights and expresses a willingness to talk, but persists in denying any involvement in the
crime? May the police then display apparent sympathy? Tell the suspect he might as well
confess because there is so much evidence against him? Subject him to a hostile, shorttempered interrogator and then turn him over to a friendly, gentle one? Or does Miranda's
prohibition against police cajoling and deception in obtaining a waiver of rights, see 384 U.S.
at 476, apply to post-waiver police interrogation as well? Miranda does not say.
As Laurie Magid points out in this Symposium, although the Miranda Court discussed
and "cast a disapproving look" at various police interrogation techniques, it did not forbid
them. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1209 (2001). Instead, it provided suspects with a new form of
protection. Id. at 1175; see also Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, Protections for the
Suspect under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 667-68 (1967). Since the postWarren Court "has repeatedly declined the opportunity to place any specific limits on the
use of deception during interrogation," Magid, supra, at 1176, "the 'current constitutional
doctrine.., by and large, has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanctioned, police deception
during the investigative phase.' The lower federal courts and state courts have interpreted
the Supreme Court's decisions to find that almost no type of deception renders a confession
per se involuntary." Magid, supra, at 1177 (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretextand
Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 777 (1997)).
50. See Leo, supra note 49, at 1017-21; Richard Leo and Welsh S. White, Adapting to
Miranda: Modern Interrogators'Strategiesfor Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda,
84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999). For example, the police elicit waivers in the "overwhelming
majority" of cases, Leo, supra note 49, at 1012, and once a suspect waives his rights and
submits to interrogation, "Miranda offers very little, if any, meaningful protection," id. at
1015. Although suspects who agree to talk to the police may still cut off questioning at any
time, "they almost never call a halt to questioning or invoke their right to have the assistance
of counsel." Stuntz, supra note 49, at 977; see also id. at 988.
It should be noted that suspects with criminal records "appear disproportionately likely
to invoke their rights and terminate interrogation." Leo, supra note 49, at 1009-10. This
supports Professor Stuntz's argument that "the suspects who need Miranda's protection least
are the ones who use it most." Stuntz, supra note 49, at 999.
51. Leo, supra note 49, at 1027.
52. For example, suppose in a Miranda-less world that a custodial suspect were to ask
the police whether she had to answer their questions or whether the police had a right to an
answer? How should the police respond? As I have suggested elsewhere, a good argument
may be made that, as it had evolved by the time of Miranda, the due process-voluntariness
test would have barred the use of any statements made by a suspect who had been told that
she must answer police questions or that the police had a right to an answer. See Yale
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Moreover, the Chief Justice may have been aware that "[a] finding
that the police have properly informed the suspect of his Miranda
rights.., often has the effect of minimizing or eliminating the scrutiny
applied to post-waiver interrogation practices."53 In Dickerson, the
Court did recall an observation it had made a decade and a half earlier
4
one supported by a very recent survey of lower court decisions1 _
that " '[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument
that a self-incriminating statement was "compelled" despite the fact
that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of
Miranda are rare.'
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist may have regarded Dickerson as
an occasion for the Court to maintain its power against Congress. As
Professor Craig Bradley recently observed:
[F]or the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda itself is one thing; to stand
by while Congress does this is quite another. In Dickerson,
the majority
56
sent a strong message to Congress: Stay off our turf!
"55

IV.

WHY WERE THERE No CONCURRING OPINIONS IN DICKERSON?

This still does not explain why none of the other Justices who made
up the 7-2 majority wrote a concurring opinion. Why, for example, did
Justice Stevens, who had written a strong dissent in Oregon v. Elstad 7
defending the constitutional status of Miranda, not write separately in
Dickerson, urging the Court to overturn, or at least re-examine,
Elstad, now that the premise of the case - Miranda is not a
constitutional ruling - no longer seemed operative? Why, to take
Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of CriminalProcedure: A Reply to Professor Grano,
23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 588 & n. 178 (1990).
53. White, supra note 49, at 1220. Consider, too, Leo, supra note 49, at 1021-22:
"Miranda has helped law enforcement by de facto displacing the case-by-case voluntariness
standard as the primary test of a confession's admissibility, in effect shifting courts' analysis
from the voluntariness of a confession to the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver." See also
Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 744-46 (1992); Stuntz,
supra note 49, at 988-90.
54. "A survey of recent decisions," reports Professor White in this Symposium,
"suggests that, when the police have complied with Miranda, it is very difficult for a
defendant to establish that a confession obtained after a Miranda waiver violated due
process." White, supra note 49, at 1219.
55. 120 S. Ct. at 2336 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20 (1984)).
56. Bradley, supra note 47, at 80. Consider, too, Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman,
Shared ConstitutionalInterpretation,2000 SuP. CT. REV. (forthcoming):
[Section 35011 was a slap at the Court, and if any Court was likely to slap back, it was
this one. For the Court that in recent years has given us Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida [517 U.S. 44 (1996)], Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. [514 U.S. 211(1995)], City
of Boerne v. Flores [521 U.S. 507 (1997)] and other decisions favoring its own power at

the expense of Congress, Section 3501 was a gnat that ran into the windshield of
whatever it was that Miranda held.
57. See discussion supra note 29.
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another example, did Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Justice David
Souter not write a separate opinion urging the Court to overturn, or at
least reconsider, cases holding that a defendant who takes the stand in
his own defense can be impeached by statements taken from him in
violation of Miranda" - even statements obtained from him after he
asserts his right to counsel. 9
I share George Thomas's observation in this Symposium that
Harrisv. New York, the first impeachment case and "the very first case
in which the Court departed from Miranda's bright line,"' may be
"[tihe best example of the disconnect between Miranda and the Fifth
Amendment."61 As the Court made clear some years after Harris,
neither testimony given by a person in response to a grant of immunity
(New Jersey v. Portash)62 nor statements that are "involuntary" or
"coerced" in the pre-Mirandasense (Mincey v. Arizona)63 can be used
for impeachment purposes. Harris, Portash, and Mincy seemed to
draw a distinct line between statements that are not really, but only
presumptively, compelled (Miranda violations) and those that are
actually compelled or compelled "in its most pristine form" (Portash)
or compelled within the meaning of the pre-Mirandavoluntariness test
(Mincy). 64 Now that Dickerson is on the books, how can statements
obtained in violation of Miranda be regarded as any less
traditional
that
violate
than
statements
unconstitutional
"voluntariness" standards?
I suspect that if one of the concurring opinions I have suggested
had in fact been written, it would have provoked one or more of the
other members of the 7-2 majority (especially Justice O'Connor,
author of the majority opinion in Elstad) to have written separately in
response - and the 7-2 majority would have splintered badly. Even
though the Chief Justice wrote a rather flat opinion, there is a good
deal to be said (especially if one is in favor of Miranda) for an opinion
reaffirming Miranda written by one of the most police-oriented
Justices in Supreme Court history - particularly when that opinion is
written such that six other members of the Court are willing to sign on.

58. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
59. Hass, 420 U.S. at 714.
60. George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the
Due Process Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2001).
61. Id. at 1089.
62. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
63. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). In Hass, the Court noted that "[tihere is no evidence or
suggestion" that the defendant's statements "were involuntary or coerced." 420 U.S. at 722.
64. See Thomas, supra note 60, at 1089. As Professor Thomas notes, almost everyone
reads Portashas "settl[ing] the question of whether statements taken in violation of Miranda
are compelled under the Fifth Amendment - they are not." Id. at 1089.
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I venture to say, however, that defense lawyers will soon discover
that the Chief Justice wrote an opinion reaffirming Miranda as it has
been shaped (some, including me, would say misshaped) in the past
three decades. What has been reaffirmed, at least as far as the Chief
Justice is concerned, is not the Miranda doctrine as it burst onto the
scene in 1966, but Miranda with all its exceptions attached - or, as
Laurie Magid described it in a recent conversation with me, Miranda
with all its exceptions "frozen in time."
Encouraged by Dickerson, defense lawyers will try hard to restore
Miranda to its original vigor. But they are likely to discover that,
although Dickerson seemingly repudiated the premises on which some
Miranda-debilitating decisions are based, the exceptions to Miranda
are going to remain in place.65 They are also likely to discover that
language in Dickerson that does not seem very significant at the
moment will take on considerable importance.
I am afraid that lawyers trying to reinvigorate Miranda will be
reminded that, what the Chief Justice calls "the sort of modifications
represented by [the] cases [interpreting Miranda narrowly]"66 - what
some, including me, would call cases drawing distinctions between

65. The scope of some of these exceptions, however, is unclear and may plausibly be
limited. Take, for example, the "impeachment exception" to Miranda. See supra notes 61-64
and accompanying text. Although the California Supreme Court ruled otherwise in People v.
Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998), a good argument can be
made, especially after Dickerson, that at the very least a statement obtained in violation of
Miranda cannot be used for impeachment purposes if taken in deliberate violation of
Miranda. See the discussion of Peavy, Dickerson and other cases in Charles D. Weisselberg,
In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1126-34 (2001). See also Susan
R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental
Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1061-63 (2001)
(suggesting that the Court ought to limit its Miranda exceptions to unintentional violations).
Consider, too, Oregon v. Elstad, discussed supra note 32, which permits the use of at
least some "fruits" of Miranda violations. Although Miranda's friends on the Court probably
will be unable to overturn Elstad, now that Dickerson is on the books they may be able to
persuade a majority to read the Elstad exception fairly narrowly.
For one thing, the failure to advise Mr. Elstad of his Miranda rights seemed inadvertent.
If, for example, Elstad had asserted his right to counsel at his first meeting with the police
and the police had refused to honor that right, the result might have been different. (At one
point in her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor distinguished the situation in Elstad
from cases where suspects' invocation of their rights "were flatly ignored while police
subjected them to continued interrogation." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 313 n.3 (1985).)
Moreover, in Elstad the "fruit of the poisonous tree" was a second confession and in
Tucker it was the testimony of a witness. As dissenting Justice Brennan pointed out in
Elstad, the majority "relies heavily on individual 'volition' as an insulating factor ... [a
factor] altogether missing in the context of inanimate evidence." Id. at 347 n.29.
The Court has never addressed explicitly whether physical or nontestimonial evidence
derived from a Miranda violation is admissible. Nevertheless, the Court came very close to
saying as much in Elstad, id. at 308, and ever since Elstad was decided "federal and state
courts have almost uniformly ruled that the prosecution can introduce nontestimonial fruits
of a Miranda violation in a criminal trial," David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should
Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 835-36 (1992).
66. Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2335.
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Miranda violations and "real" constitutional violations67 that no longer
seem defensible after Dickerson - are, to quote the Chief Justice's
opinion in Dickerson again, "as much a normal part of constitutional
law as the original decision."68
Defense lawyers will also be reminded, to quote the Chief Justice's
opinion in Dickerson one more time:
[O]ur subsequent cases [those applying Miranda begrudgingly] have
reduced the [adverse] impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law
enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned
statements [as opposed to evidence brought to light as a result of these
improperly obtained statements] may not be used as evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief [as opposed to its use on cross-examination
69 if
the defendant has the audacity to take the stand in his own defense].
As already indicated, I believe that the various exceptions imposed
on Miranda have made it a much less formidable rule than the Warren
Court contemplated. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however,
that the significant number of "exceptions" Miranda has endured is a
principal reason why it is still alive at the ripe age of thirty-five.
V.

WHY WAS THE MAJORITY OPINION IN DICKERSON SO FLAT?

I applaud the Dickerson Court's invalidation of § 3501, but I must
admit that I was taken aback by the Court's opinion. I usually discount
criticism of a case when made by losing counsel, but this time I am
sympathetic when Paul Cassell complains that "the skimpy, jerry-built
opinion"7 handed down by the Dickerson Court "leaves [current]
Miranda doctrine incoherent."7
Another Symposium participant, Susan Klein, puts it even more
strongly. Although she likes the decision in Dickerson, striking down
§ 3501, she calls the opinion of the Court "in a word, terrible."7 She
maintains that the Court "breached its duty to provide a justification
for Miranda or Dickerson and squandered an opportunity to
rationalize contradictory case law regarding Miranda's exceptions."73
For example, the Chief Justice's attempt to explain why the "fruit-ofthe-poisonous-tree" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases
67. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Warren Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442-43 (1987).
68. 120 S.Ct. at 2335.
69. Id. at 2336.
70. Cassell, supra note 13, at 902.
71. Id. at 901. As the Dickerson Court noted, "[b]ecause no party to the underlying
litigation argued in favor of § 3501's constitutionality in this Court," the Court appointed
Professor Cassell to defend the statute. 120 S.Ct. at 2335 n.7.
72. Klein, supra note 65, at 1071.
73. Id.
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does not apply to Miranda violations - "unreasonable searches under
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogations
under the Fifth75 Amendment"74 - "comes dangerously close to being a
non sequitur.

Many of this Symposium's participants have said unkind things
about the quality of Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dickerson opinion and
many others undoubtedly will say similar unkind things about it
elsewhere. How is the Chief Justice likely to react to such criticism?
By taking it in stride.
I have no doubt that there are some Justices who are interested in,
and concerned about, how they are regarded by law professors (and
how they will be viewed by future law professors). But I know of no
evidence that Rehnquist is one of them. In Dickerson I imagine his
thinking might have gone along these lines:
I have seven votes - a larger majority than almost anyone
expected. Moreover, there are no concurring opinions which means
74. 120 S. Ct. at 2334.
75. Klein, supra note 65, at 1073. Professor Klein adds:
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, since it is not clear on the face of the Fourth
Amendment that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded from trial, whereas it is clear from the face of the Fifth Amendment that compelled
confessions must be excluded, if anything the argument for excluding fruits of SelfIncrimination Clause violations is considerably stronger.
Id. at 1073 n.195. I believe Professor Klein's strong criticism of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Dickerson is well deserved. The fact that the Chief Justice made a feeble attempt
to reconcile Elstad with the "constitutionalized" Miranda doctrine does not mean, however,
that no plausible explanations exist. Professor Klein herself suggests that Elstad and most
other exceptions to Miranda may be reconciled with Miranda's constitutional status on the
ground that these exceptions "involved a good faith or unintentional violation of the
prophylactic rule, coupled with particularly high costs for implementing the rule," id. at 1061.
Elsewhere in this Symposium, Professor Strauss observes:
Whatever one thinks of the holding in Elstad [declining to apply the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine to Miranda violations, at least to certain violations], there is nothing
inconsistent, in principle, between this approach and the view that Miranda is required by
the Self-Incrimination Clause. Miranda is required by the Self-Incrimination Clause because
that Clause has to be implemented in some way; any method of implementation will strike
some balance of advantages and disadvantages; and Miranda strikes the best balance in the
circumstances presented by that case. In different circumstances, such as in Elstad (or
Quarles, or Tucker), a different balance might be best.
To make the comparison to the First Amendment once again, the constitutional rules
governing defamation of public officials are different from the rules governing defamation of
private individuals, which are in turn different from the rules governing defamation that
addresses no subject of public interest. These differences do not mean that the rule of New
York Times v. Sullivan is not a constitutional rule. They just mean that the constitutional rule
that applies in one set of circumstances might have to altered when different circumstances
arise - a wholly unremarkable proposition....
It may be that the Court struck the wrong balance in Elstad... (or, for that matter, in
Miranda itself). But the fact that the Court refined the balance it struck in Miranda, when
cases presenting different circumstances arose, has no bearing on the constitutional status or
legitimacy of that decision.
David A. Strauss, Miranda, The Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 968-69
(2001).
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the large majority speaks with a single voice (mine), which is
important in high-profile cases such as this one. To be sure, Justice
Scalia has taken a number of robust swings at me and not a few would
say he has landed some hard blows.76 But the exuberance he exhibits in
his dissent is likely to diminish his effectiveness. Moreover, I have
picked up Miranda'sstrongest supporters on the Court as well as both
of the perennial "swing votes" (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). On the
other hand, only one member of the Court (Thomas, J.) has joined
Justice Scalia's dissent. If I try to respond to all of Justice Scalia's
arguments I may say something that would lead one or more members
of my 7-2 majority to break away and write a separate concurring
opinion. The same result may follow if I try too hard to reconcile what
I have said today with what I have said (and some members of my
majority have said) about Miranda in the past three decades. All
things considered, more or less ignoring Justice Scalia's forceful
dissent is the better part of valor. I have written a "compromise
opinion 7 7 and such opinions rarely, if ever, win any awards for
excellence. So be it. The important thing is that six other members of
the Court are willing to sign it. I have achieved my objective. I have
struck down § 3501 and "reaffirmed" Miranda (but not the Miranda
the Warren Court thought it had produced). I do not deny that my
opinion has a few loose ends. Nor do I deny that it leaves a good deal
unsaid. Again, so be it. Let the professors figure it out.
Well, we have quite a few professors in this Symposium, so let us
proceed...

76. I have written another article that discusses Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion at
great length. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the
Majority and DissentingOpinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 401-25 (2001).
77. "The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of Miranda,
wrote the majority opinion in Dickerson," observes Professor Don Dripps, is "a sure sign of
a compromise opinion, intentionally written to say less rather than more, for the sake of
achieving a strong majority on the narrow question of Miranda's continued vitality." Dripps,
supra note 1, at 3 (on file with author).
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